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Abstract
This chapter reviews social neuroscience research that links social psychological attitudes and evaluative processes to
their presumed neural bases. The chapter is organized into four parts. The first section discusses how attitude representations are transformed into evaluative states that can be used to guide thought and action. The next two sections
address the related processes of attitude learning and change. The final section discusses applications of these concepts for the study of prejudice and political behavior.
Keywords: attitudes, evaluation, reinforcement, conditioning, amygdala, striatum, orbitofrontal cortex, prefrontal
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The concepts of attitude and evaluation have been
central to social psychology for nearly a century. This
should not be surprising, as the ubiquitous act of assigning positive or negative valence is crucial for survival, be
it in guiding immediate behavior toward or away from
an object, or in anticipation of future rewards or punishments. Through accumulated experience, these evaluative judgments can be consolidated in memory to form a
summary attitude, which can be recalled to guide future
behavior. These summary attitudes, though imperfect
at times, allow for the construction of quick evaluative
judgments when similar stimuli or situations occur. For
example, once we learn that someone is untrustworthy,
we can avoid that person in future situations without
needing to re-evaluate all of our previous interactions
with the individual. Thus, attitudes enable us to predict
the value of objects and the behavior of others, allowing
us to adapt to the world through experience and make
advantageous decisions.

In this chapter, we review social neuroscience research that links social psychological attitudes and evaluative processes to their presumed neural bases. The
chapter is organized into four parts. In the first section,
we discuss how attitude representations are transformed
into evaluative states that can be used to guide thought
and action. In the next two sections, we address the related processes of attitude formation and change. In the
last section, we discuss applications of these concepts
for the study of prejudice and political behavior.

Attitude Expression
The processes of attitude expression involve the translation of attitudinal representations into an active evaluation that can be used to inform thoughts and behavior
(see Cunningham & Zelazo, 2007). Whereas an attitude
refers to a relatively stable set of representations (only
212
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some of which may be active at any time), an evaluation
reflects the current processing state of the evaluative system (which is determined by the aspects of the attitude
that are currently active). Evaluative processes help determine the motivational significance of a stimulus as
well as its expected reward or punishment value. In order to do so, these processes draw upon pre- existing attitudes, as well as novel information about the stimulus,
contextual information, and current goal states. Evaluative states arise out of dynamic interactions between
these elements. Encountered or imagined stimuli (e.g.,
people, objects, or abstract concepts) elicit relatively automatic evaluations, but these initial “gut reactions”
can be modulated by an increasing number of higherlevel cognitive and reflective processes (Cunningham &
Zelazo, 2007). These higher-order reflective processes
send information back to the lower-order processes, allowing for a re-evaluation of the affective response and,
if necessary, a different affective interpretation of the
same stimuli. This allows for the foregrounding of more
relevant and congruent affective representations and the
backgrounding of irrelevant or incongruent contextual
information in order to achieve a more nuanced evaluation congruent with the current context and/or goals.
When considering the brain regions involved in generating these evaluative predictions, the amygdala has
received the most attention. Ever since the classic work
of Kluver and Bucy (1937; see also Weiskrantz, 1956)
demonstrated that lesions to the temporal lobes led to
a decrease in avoidance of potentially threatening stimuli, a common frame- work for understanding amygdala
function has been fear detection and conditioning (see
next section). Research using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in humans has shown that the
amygdala is involved in the detection of threat in many
stimulus modalities, including the perception of visual
facial expressions of fear (Adolphs et al., 1999; Calder,
Keane, Manes, Antoun, & Young, 2000; Morris et al.,
1998), cognitive representations of fear (Phelps et al.,
2001), threat-related words (Isenberg et al., 1999), and
aversive odors (Zald & Pardo, 1997). Given this body of
research, Freese and Amaral (2009) have suggested that
the amygdala detects danger and then automatically directs behavioral responses.
An examination of the anatomic connections with
the amygdala suggests that this region is well suited for
automatic vigilance and organized response functions
(Davis & Whalen, 2001). Specifically, the amygdala
has widespread connections to areas associated with
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perceptual processing and autonomic/ visceral activation (see Freese & Amaral, 2009, for a review). Thus,
following amygdala activation, greater attention can be
directed to the stimulus while the body prepares for immediate action. Furthermore, the amygdala has multiple connections to areas of prefrontal cortex (Aggleton,
Burton, & Passingham, 1980), receiving from and relaying information to areas of orbitofrontal, insular, and
lateral prefrontal cortices (Amaral & Price, 1984; Stefanacci & Amaral, 2000). These connections allow information processed in the amygdala to be used by regions
involved in more deliberate forms of decision-making.
Through reciprocal connections, amygdala activation
can be modulated to take into consideration the entire
state of the organism. Thus, following amygdala activation, multiple brain systems are dynamically reorganized (or given the opportunity to reorganize) to appropriately deal with the current environment.
One critical aspect of amygdala function concerns
the speed at which it can evaluate the rapid stream of
incoming information. Many models of amygdala function suggest that it operates relatively automatically and
unconsciously, and current research has provided support for this idea. For example, conscious awareness of
a valenced stimulus does not appear to be necessary to
produce amygdala activation. In a conceptual replication of previous research on supraliminal face processing (Morris et al., 1996), Whalen and colleagues (1998)
demonstrated that subliminal presentations of emotionally fearful faces led to amygdala activation. In addition,
Morris, Öhman, and Dolan (1998) found that after participants were classically conditioned to associate particular angry faces with an aversive stimulus, the amygdala showed greater activity to these conditioned faces
than to the control faces, using both subliminal and supraliminal presentations. Using depth electrodes, Kawasaki and colleagues (2001) found that the processing
of valence (greater neural firing to valenced as opposed
to neutral stimuli) occurred 200 milliseconds after stimulus presentation in single-cell recordings of the human amygdala. Taken together, these studies indicate
that the human amygdala responds rapidly to valenced
stimuli, even when they are presented outside conscious
awareness.
However, the suggestion that the amygdala’s role in
evaluation is valence specific has been called into question. Specifically, several studies have since shown that
the amygdala is sensitive not only to fearful or negative
information, but also to positive information (Hamann,
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Ely, Hoffman, & Kilts, 2002; Hamann & Mao, 2002;
Garavan et al., 2001; Liberzon et al., 2003), leading to
at least two competing theoretical positions. First, it is
possible that the amygdala provides evaluative information about both positive and negative stimuli. According
to this view, the amygdala is active whenever generating
both positive or negative evaluations. Alternatively, amygdala activation may reflect some process associated with
evaluative processing other than valence, such as stimulus
intensity or arousal. Hamann and colleagues (2002) replicated the finding that the amygdala responds not only
to positive and negative stimuli, but also to unusual or
interesting stimuli, suggesting that it serves a more general function than just processing valence. Further, studies that have independently manipulated valence and intensity (Anderson et al., 2003; Small et al., 2003), or used
statistical methods to separate the contributions of the
two (Cunningham, Raye, & Johnson, 2004), have provided evidence that amygdala activity appears to be associated more with processing affective intensity than with
processing any particular valence. Consistent with this
idea, patients with bilateral amygdala damage have impaired recognition of emotional arousal, while recognition of valence remains intact (Adolphs, Russell, & Tranel, 1999; see Berntson, Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, &
Cacioppo, 2007 for a more nuanced perspective).
One explanation for these findings has been to suggest that amygdala activation may reflect the processing
of motivationally relevant stimuli, perhaps recruiting
additional resources to facilitate appropriate interactions with the stimulus (e.g., Sander, Grafman, & Zalla,
2003). According to this view, a primary early function
of attitudes is to inform us about what is important in
any particular situation — then modulate the appropriate second-order perceptual, attentional, autonomic, or
cogni- tive/conceptual processes that allow us to deal
with the challenges or opportunities that are present. If
this is the case, then amygdala activation should vary as
a function of the goals of the organism.
To examine the motivational flexibility of and topdown influences on amygdala activation, Cunningham, Raye, and Johnson (2005) presented participants
with positively and negatively valenced stimuli during
fMRI scanning. After scanning, participants completed
an individual differences measure of their prevention—
and promotion—focus orientation (i.e., participants indicated whether they were more motivated by negative
or positive stimuli, respectively; Higgins, 1997). Consistent with this idea, among participants who were more
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promotion focused, greater activation was observed in
the amygdala, anterior cingulate gyrus, and extrastriate
cortex for positive stimuli. For more prevention-focused
participants, greater activation was observed in these
same regions for negative stimuli.
In addition, a recent experimental study has provided
evidence that situational motives shape amygdala processing in a dynamic fashion (Cunningham, Van Bavel, &
Johnsen, 2008). In this study, participants were presented
with famous names and asked to focus on either the positive or negative aspects of the person (e.g., ignoring everything bad, how good is this person?). Activity in bilateral amygdala and insula was found to vary as a function
of evaluative fit. That is, when focusing on negativity,
greater amygdala and insula activity was associated with
participants’ negativity ratings of the names, but not positivity ratings (recorded after scanning). The opposite pattern was found for the positive-focus condition, such that
greater activity was observed in these same regions to ratings of positivity than negativity. Taken together, these
studies suggest that chronic and situational motivational
concerns can modulate the processing of valenced information to generate situationally appropriate evaluations.
These studies demonstrate the power of top-down processes to modulate lower-order processes and provide a
new understanding of amygdala function.
Beyond the Amygdala
Although most attention has been directed toward
the amygdala, evaluative processes are associated with a
much larger circuit involving additional cortical and subcortical regions. Among the more critical subcortical regions associated with evaluation is the ventral striatum,
and more specifically the nucleus accumbens (NAcc).
Linking NAcc activity to evaluation more closely, studies of economic decision making have shown that NAcc
activity is not only correlated with, but is even sometimes a better predictor of, a participant’s choice to buy
a particular product than is self-report (Knutson et al,
2007). 1 Critically, whereas the amygdala activation appears to be associated with the evaluation of both positive and negative stimuli, the NAcc is primarily involved
in the anticipation of positive outcomes and/or receipt
of incentives or rewards (Breiter, Aharon, & Kahneman,
2001; Cardinal et al., 2002; Knutson et al., 2001). That
is, while the amygdala may not be valence specific, the
NAcc may allow for dissociated representations of positive and negative evaluation (see Cacioppo & Berntson,
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1994 for a detailed review of evidence of dissociated
processing of positive and negative valence).
Whereas activity in the amygdala has been shown to
play a role in directing attention towards motivationally
significant stimuli and automatically preparing for behavior, little evidence has been found to suggest that this
activation leads to the experience of subjective preference. That is, although activation in the amygdala is correlated with objective attitude ratings (Cunningham et
al., 2003, 2004), the actual subjective pleasantness associated with receiving (or displeasure associated with not
receiving) an expected outcome is correlated with activation in orbitofrontal cortex (OFC; Kringelbach, 2005).
Orbitofrontal cortex activity is evident for primary rewards such as food or drink (Kringelbach, O’Doherty,
Rolls, & Andrews, 2003; Rolls, 2000), as well as symbolic rewards, such as money (Tom, Fox, Trepel, & Poldrack, 2007; Elliott, Newman, Longe, & William Deakin, 2003; Knutson et al., 2003). Orbitofrontal cortex
activity has also been linked to the evaluation of the
relative appropriateness of one’s responses, activating
both to receiving rewards and avoiding punishments
(Cunningham, Mowrer, & Kesek, 2009; Kim, Shimojo,
& O’Doherty, 2006). Specifically, activity in the medial OFC is typically related to evaluations of positive
or rewarding information, whereas activity in the lateral OFC is related to evaluations of negative or punishing information (see Kringelbach & Rolls, 2004 for a
review). Thus, while the amygdala and nucleus accumbens may provide information regarding expected outcomes following the perception of a stimulus, the OFC
represents the current subjective evaluation.
Because the OFC receives input from multiple sensory modalities, it may play an important role in providing a common metric for representing and comparing
disparate aspects of evaluative information (Montague
& Berns, 2002; Murray, O’Doherty, & Schoenbaum,
2007; Rolls, 2000; Padoa-Schioppa & Assad, 2006;
Wallis & Miller, 2003). Thus, the evaluative connotation of a friendship, a new car, or the ideals of egalitarianism can be reduced to a common evaluative dimension and directly compared across stimulus type. In this
sense, whereas relatively more limbic regions may encode and retrieve objective S-R associations, the conversion from attitude to subjective evaluation (which
can vary as a function of different contextual factors)
may require the OFC. Specifically, activity in medial
OFC is typically related to evaluations of positive or rewarding information, whereas activity in lateral OFC is
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related to evaluations of negative or punishing information (Anderson et al., 2003; Kringelbach & Rolls, 2004;
O’Doherty et al., 2003; but see Northoffet al., 2000).
To the extent that the amygdala and nucleus accumbens provide information regarding expected outcomes
following the perception of a stimulus, and the OFC
represents the current state of the organism, the dense
reciprocal connections between amygdala and OFC allow for a comparison of expected rewards and punishments with current experience. Support for this idea
comes from research demonstrating large OFC activations following violations of expectancies (Nobre et al.,
1999) and the inability of patients with OFC damage to
update representations when predictions and outcomes
are incongruent (Rolls et al., 2004; Fellows & Farah,
2003). Thus, whereas subcortical systems provide a
low–resolution estimate of likely outcomes, regions of
the OFC may be involved in integrating amygdala output with current experience, allowing the current context to play a role in shaping the evaluation (e.g., Blair,
2004; Beer, Heery, Keltner, Scabini, & Knight, 2003;
Rolls, 2000; Rolls, Hornak, Wade, & McGrath, 1994).
Constructing More Elaborated Evaluations
In many cases, the evaluation resulting from processing in the amygdala and OFC will be sufficient to
produce a behavioral response. In other cases, however, this joint processing may lead to conflict or uncertainty about the stimulus or a predicted outcome. The
presence of conflict triggers anterior cingulate cortex activation (see Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000; Carter et al.,
1998), which may then signal the need for additional
processing of the stimulus in regions of the lateral prefrontal cortex involved in cognitive control (see Bunge
& Zelazo, 2006; MacDonald, Cohen, Stenger, & Carter,
2000; Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, Crone, & Nieuwenhuis,
2004). This additional processing in the lateral prefrontal cortex allows for regulation of affect in a top-down
fashion by deliberately amplifying or suppressing the
processing of certain aspects of the stimulus, changing
the input to the system for subsequent processing. Reprocessing will likely modify the current evaluation by
modulating activity in lower-order regions (e.g., Cunningham, Johnson et al., 2004; Ochsner, Bunge, Gross,
& Gabrieli, 2002; Ochsner et al., 2004).
More complex networks of processing allow for more
complex construals of a stimulus. This occurs because
more information about a stimulus can be integrated
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into the construal and because these networks support
the formulation and use of higher-order rules for deliberately selecting certain aspects of a stimulus or context
to which to attend (Bunge & Zelazo, 2006; Cunningham
& Zelazo, 2007). The selection function of prefrontal
cortex may foreground specific aspects of information
(and background others). Further, prefrontal cortex may
also play a role in keeping current goals and contextual
demands/constraints in mind, which is important for
fulfilling the competing goals of minimizing error while
minimizing processing load (e.g., Cunningham, Zelazo,
Packer, & Van Bavel, 2007). This characterization of
the prefrontal cortex is consistent with its hypothesized
role in allowing for higher levels of reflective consciousness via reprocessing (Zelazo, 2004) and in the monitoring and control of cognition and behavior (e.g., Carver
& Scheier, 2001; Shallice, 1982; Stuss & Benson, 1986).
Taken together, the dynamic interactions among different brain regions support a flexible and complex process
of evaluation that unfolds over time and exists on a continuum from relatively automatic (and simple) to relatively reflective (and complex).
Attitude Formation
The goal of an adaptive learning system is to develop
appropriate and accurate estimates of the future value
of certain stimuli. As such, attitudes reflect our previous experience with the environment and the learning
that accompanies our ongoing positive and negative experiences. To the extent that positive experiences accompany the presence of particular stimuli or following a
particular behavior, a more positive attitude will develop
(and negative attitudes will develop for negative experiences). The next time that we encounter that same (or
similar) situation, our evaluative system can infer that
a similar positive (or negative) experience will occur. In
general, attitudes that follow direct experience are likely
to develop more quickly and result in stronger predictions (Fazio & Zanna, 1981).
The assumptions of reinforcement conditioning can
be best summarized by Thorndike’s law of effect (1911),
which states that an organism will be more likely to repeat actions associated with a reward, and less likely to
repeat actions associated with a punishment or negative
stimulus. Whereas classical conditioning establishes an
evaluative association between one’s previous experiences and the attitude object, instrumental conditioning
forms associations between hedonic outcomes and the
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behavior that produced them. Furthermore, instrumental conditioning involves a fundamentally different set
of interactions between the cortical structures and neurotransmitters comprising the instrumental response,
which are discussed in detail below.
The most well-known example of both classical and
instrumental conditioning is that of fear conditioning
(Watson & Rayner, 1920), and among the brain structures believed to be involved in fear conditioning, the
amygdala has received the most attention (Davis, 1992;
Adolphs, Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 1995; LeDoux,
Cicchetti, Xagoraris, & Romanski, 1990). For example,
during fMRI, the amygdala is active while learning evaluative contingencies (LaBar, Gatenby, Gore, LeDoux,
& Phelps, 1998), and patients with amygdala lesions do
not show fear conditioning (LaBar, LeDoux, Spencer, &
Phelps, 1995). Although much of the learning literature
assigns the amygdala a critical role in fear conditioning,
recent research has also demonstrated an important association between the amygdala and the processing of reward-related and novel information (see Murray, 2007
for a review). For example, studies of appetitive conditioning on rats with amygdala lesions have shown that
the amygdala is necessary for learning some approach
behaviors (Cardinal, Parkinson, Lachenal, et al., 2002;
Everitt et al., 1999). The human amygdala exhibits a similar pattern of reward processing. Among hungry participants conditioned to associate a visual cue with the odor
of a pleasant-smelling food, the amygdala is more active in response to seeing this conditioned visual stimulus
than in participants whose hunger has been sated (Gottfried, O’Doherty, & Dolan, 2003). Taken together, these
studies suggest that the amygdala plays an active role
in conditioned responses regardless of valence (Everitt,
Cardinal, Hall, Parkinson, & Robbins, 2000).
Beyond the Amygdala
As in the attitude expression literature, it is a mistake
to ascribe too much function to the amygdala. In particular, areas of the striatum and prefrontal cortex also play
important roles in reinforcement learning. One prominent theory of striatal contributions to reinforcement
learning is that of the actor/critic model (Sutton & Barto,
1998; but see Khamassi et al., 2005), in which the ventral
and dorsal striatum serve distinct functions in generating
evaluative representations. According to this model, the
ventral striatum plays the role of the “critic,” generating
predictions about the likely reward value of a particular
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stimulus. The ventral striatum updates representations to
the extent that the prediction and the actual outcome differ (the temporal difference error), which is relayed to the
dorsal striatum. This dorsal region (the “actor”) then processes this information and makes certain stimulus-response associations more or less likely, depending on the
hedonic outcome previously experienced.
To empirically test these roles for dorsal and ventral
striatum in humans, O’Doherty and colleagues (2004)
hypothesized that these regions would also show differences in activation in response to the amount of control
participants had in choosing a particular reward. Two
groups were formed, one involving instrumental learning and the other classical learning. In the instrumental learning condition, participants were able to choose
which stimuli they preferred based on expected value
(i.e., the hedonic value of the reward multiplied by the
probability of receiving it), while in the classical learning condition a computer chose the stimuli and the
participants had to guess which stimulus was chosen.
Ventral striatum activity was observed across both conditions, consistent with its role in appraising predicted
value. Dorsal striatum activity, on the other hand, was
positively correlated with the prediction error signal during instrumental conditioning. This result supports the
hypothesis that this region serves in an “actor” role in
exhibiting greater prediction-error-related activity when
rewards are chosen during instrumental conditioning, as
opposed to classical conditioning.
Although the computations provided by the basal
ganglia may appear sufficient for outcome reinforcement learning, current neurobiologically constrained
computational models of reinforcement learning and
decision-making indicate that the orbitofrontal cortex
(OFC) plays a complementary role to the basal ganglia system (see Frank & Claus, 2006). Specifically,
the OFC appears to be necessary for representing current reward states (Knutson, Fong, Bennett, Adams, &
Hommer, 2003; O’Doherty, Kringelbach, Rolls, Hornak, & Andrews, 2001) and updating representations
when stimulus contingencies change (Chudasama &
Robbins, 2003; Fellows & Farah, 2003). As noted earlier, the OFC may provide a representation of reward
magnitude currently being received, which can then be
used to flexibly guide behavior and update representations in basal ganglia. That is, the computations of hedonic state from the OFC may provide a powerful input to the comparison between predicted and received
outcomes to generate prediction error signals.
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While conditioning forms a critical part of the formation of attitudes, there are several instances where
attitudes can form in the absence of direct experience.
For example, people can learn the evaluative association of a stimulus without any direct experience with
the aversive stimulus per se (e.g., Bandura, 1977). People can learn by observing others’ responses, or by simply being told that something is good or bad, helpful
or harmful. To illustrate this point, Phelps et al. (2001)
verbally instructed participants that they would receive
at least one shock during the course of an fMRI experiment when a particular stimulus was presented. Although no shocks were ever received during scanning,
the authors observed left amygdala activation when the
threatening stimulus was presented. The verbally created association between the stimulus and the potentially aversive outcome was therefore sufficient to elicit
an amygdala response. Evidence for the amygdala’s
potential role in observational learning was provided
in a follow-up study. Participants that simply watched
someone else receiving shocks during a conditioning
task had greater amygdala activated to the conditioned
stimuli (Olsson, Nearing, & Phelps, 2007). Lastly, the
social status of a person has been shown to alter brain
activity without direct experience. When playing a trust
game, participants has less striatum activity to partners
who were portrayed to be trustworthy or untrustworthy
when compared to neutral partners (Delgado, Frank, &
Phelps, 2005). This suggests that social knowledge may
have the ability to supersede conditioned knowledge
(and the conditioning process).
Overall, these findings highlight an exciting array of
possibilities for learning and attitude formation beyond
simple classical conditioning. The ability to mentally
empathize and learn from observation produces neural
effects similar to those produced through classical conditioning alone. We can dislike groups of people who
we have never met, have an aversion to new situations,
or have abstract opinions for which we would be willing
to die. For such attitudes, conditioning may only play a
small part in the development and maintenance of attitude representations.
Attitude Change
Changing circumstances can necessitate the reversal of previously learned associations between stimuli
and their hedonic value. This attitude reversal can occur
when current evaluations are no longer useful, or when
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they turn out to be harmful; for example, a positive evaluation toward a seemingly delicious piece of food must
update rapidly if it induces vomiting once ingested. This
will result in a more negative evaluation the next time
that the food is encountered, suggesting that the attitude
has changed.
In exploring how this reversal learning occurs, however, it is useful to make a distinction between ingrained
attitudes that are activated more automatically, and
more flexible evaluations that can be reversed relatively
quickly. This distinction has been categorized as an interaction between the temporary, or short-term, and
the permanent, or long-term, aspects of attitude reversal (Frank & Claus, 2006). Both are relative to the number of interactions an organism has had with a certain
stimulus or situation. In the case of temporary attitude
change, for example, updating and potential reversal of
an attitude can occur from situation to situation, while
in permanent or long-term attitude change, the reversal occurs over several interactions that are contrary to a
previously held attitude.
Although we have focused thus far on the role of the
OFC in representing received rewards and helping to
provide a reinforcement signal for learning, the OFC is
also involved in the updating of evaluative representations either because the representation is no longer appropriate (e.g., extinction) or because the context or situation requires a different response (e.g., Blair, 2004;
Beer, Heery, Keltner, Scabini, & Knight, 2003; Rolls,
2000; Rolls, Hornak, Wade, & McGrath, 1994). One
way that these processes can be achieved is by providing
a complementary predictive reward signal to the basal
ganglia that updates more rapidly. Whereas the basal
ganglia learning systems slowly incorporate changes
in reward contingencies across time and situation, the
OFC can update more quickly, using recent experiences
to guide an evaluative signal. While the OFC rapidly
evaluates and processes sensory information (Kringelbach & Rolls, 2003, 2004), it is argued that this region is
also critical in evaluating the associations between environmental stimuli and reinforcement.
Due to these properties, it is possible the OFC plays a
key role in reversing or extinguishing previously learned
behavior-reward associations (Rolls, 2000). Evidence
supporting this hypothesis is illustrated by experiments
looking at the effects of learning and reversal in clinical patients with lesions in these prefrontal areas. In
one such study by Fellows and Farah (2003), evaluative reversal was examined in patients with OFC lesions.
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Patients with either ventromedial OFC (vmOFC) or
dorsolateral OFC (dlOFC) lesions performed a simple
decision-making task where the reward and loss contingencies of two decks of cards were reversed in the middle of the experiment. While dlOFC lesion patients performed equally to controls on the card game, vmOFC
patients performed significantly worse following reversal of the contingencies of the decks. For the worst performers, maximal lesion overlap was observed in the left
posteromedial orbitofrontal cortex. These results suggest that attitude reversal, which requires rapid updating, recruits areas of the vmOFC to make these behavioral changes.
Neuroimaging investigations examining these prefrontal regions have corroborated these results in
healthy subjects, and have revealed an important distinction between the medial and lateral regions of the
OFC in influencing the behavioral response to rewarding and punishing outcomes. In an fMRI investigation
by O’Doherty and colleagues (2001), two abstract fractal representations were presented in which participants
had to discover through trial and error which fractal was
associated with greater gains over multiple trials. Selecting the correct fractal would display a monetary reward
on the screen, while an incorrect choice would display
the amount lost. The values of the fractals were then
switched partway through each trial block, and blood
oxygen-level dependent (BOLD) activity was examined
during this switch. Immediately after the reversal, medial OFC activity was significantly associated with the
BOLD signal following a rewarding stimulus (i.e., the
actual receipt of the reward), while lateral OFC activity
showed a similar correlation following a punishing stimulus. In both cases, activity in these OFC regions was
correlated with the magnitude of the reward or punishment. Based on previous findings, the authors suggested
that there are limited and weak connections between the
medial and lateral OFC, while within each of these regions there exist several strong and robust neural connections. Therefore, it is useful to categorize the medial
and lateral OFC as separate structures contributing to
the updating of the relative hedonic values of rewarding
and punishing stimuli, respectively.
While the OFC has been shown to play an important role in rapidly updating and reversing attitudes, the
basal ganglia, due to its role in forming habits and unconscious motor responses (Jog, Kubota, Connolly, Hillegaart, & Graybiel, 1999; Packard & McGaugh, 1996),
is thought to be involved in updating attitudes and

Attitudes

evaluations over the long term, and is strongly modulated by dopamine (DA; Gerfen, 2000). For example,
increased DA during positive reinforcement leads to an
increased probability for the action that produced the
reinforcement (Frank & Claus, 2006; Houk, Adams, &
Barto, 1995). The structure of the dopamine pathway
itself supports this inference, as it projects to the basal
ganglia and medial region of the frontal cortex, experiencing phasic increases in DA when events are better
than expected, and phasic decreases in DA when events
are worse than expected (Schultz, Dayan, & Montague,
1997). Evidence for the basal ganglia’s role in habit formation also comes from lesion studies showing that lesions to a specific part of the striatum affect the learning
of habitual responses. For example, lesions to the dorsolateral striatum in rats led to decreased habitual responding, and an increased sensitivity to reward cues
when learning stimulus-response associations (Yin, Ostlund, Knowlton, & Belleine, 2005).
Although the basal ganglia and OFC appear to represent two different modes of learning and forming attitudes, we hypothesize that both are influenced by the
same information and differ as a function of their learning rates. The basal ganglia is influenced by all positive
and negative events providing information about the relative hedonic value of a particular stimulus or behavior, leading to predictions about the reward outcome of
a behavior over a relatively long period of time (Jog et
al., 1999). When these predictions are violated, as posited by the actor/critic model (O’Doherty et al., 2004),
an updating of representations takes place in order to reflect this new information. However, this process takes
relatively longer than that of the OFC, which is able to
update its representations rapidly on a trial-to-trial basis.
Eventually, then, the evaluations stored by the basal ganglia could become the basis for the relatively automatic
representations held in working memory by the OFC,
leading to these representations becoming the same in
both areas, until additional information is encountered
and processed by the basal ganglia. This model also possibly explains why, under cognitive load, the representation stored by the basal ganglia takes prominence. The
OFC, which contains many of the higher-order cognitive areas required for nuanced and critical thinking,
also requires significant cognitive resources to manipulate any attitudes or representations in working memory. Thus, the more automatic and readily accessible attitudes of the basal ganglia will tend to predominate in
these cognitively demanding situations.

219

Yet, not all attitudes can be represented as simple
stimulus-evaluation or stimulus-response associations.
As noted earlier, evaluations can be highly context dependent and can sometimes lead to conflict, as when
both positive and negative characteristics are associated with the attitude object, resulting in a state known
as ambivalence (Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994). Thus, although in most situations the OFC can help generate an
unambiguous evaluation constrained by a situation, this
sometimes fails, and more elaborate “higher-order” attitudes need to be developed to organize attitude representations. That is, by deliberately weighting some information more than others, individuals can form a more
integrated evaluation. Unlike inhibition, which drives
inconvenient information out of mind, these integrated
evaluations yield more complex activations, and may
represent and account for inconsistencies. The evaluations that result from this type of processing are similar
to what Petty and Cacioppo (1984) call an “elaborated
attitude,” which is known to be relatively stable and resistant to change. In this sense, these evaluations can be
thought of as “resolved ambivalence.”
In terms of the underlying brain systems for such a
process, the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) has been
shown to play a key role in modulating the activity of
both of these areas in attitude reversal. In particular,
the ACC is involved in conflict monitoring and evaluating the appropriateness of behavior in specific situations. Largely guided by contextual cues, the ACC
assists in modifying behavior to maximize hedonic reward (Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000; Carter et al., 1998;
Holroyd & Coles, 2002). The ACC is thought to signal the need for additional processing in areas of the
lateral prefrontal cortex that can reorganize representations in a more abstracted form (Hazy, Frank,
& O’Reilly, 2007; Rougier, Noelle, Braver, Cohen, &
O’Reilly, 2005). Through repeated re-organization of
the same information, a second-level representation
can be generated that can be used for subsequent judgments and behavior.

Prejudice
An early focus for the social neuroscience study of
attitudes has been the domain of prejudice. Initial studies demonstrated a role for the amygdala in the processing of other-race faces. Hart and colleagues (2000)
demonstrated that, for White participants, amygdala
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activation to supraliminal Black faces habituated more
slowly than White faces; the reverse pattern was found
for Black participants. They concluded that all faces are
processed immediately for their threat value, but that
ingroup faces are deemed safe more quickly than outgroup faces. The role of the amygdala in intergroup
perception was further expanded upon by Phelps and
colleagues (2000), who showed that greater amygdala
activation to Black than White faces was correlated
with an indirect measure of race bias that reflects a
preference for one race over the other — the Implicit
Association Test (IAT; Greenwald et al., 1998). Interestingly, for White participants, neither of these studies showed greater overall amygdala activation to Black
faces relative to White faces.
One potential explanation for not finding the expected greater amygdala activation to Black than White
faces is that control processes may inhibit or reconstrue an activated emotional response. That is, higherlevel cognitive functions may moderate automatically
activated attitudes. Thus, for participants viewing long
blocks of Black or White faces (as in Hart et al., 2000
and Phelps et al., 2000), there is greater opportunity
for control processes to dampen or attenuate any automatic effects that would otherwise be observed. Consistent with this hypothesis, Cunningham and colleagues
(2004) found that the majority of White participants
had greater amygdala activation to Black than to White
faces (which were randomly intermixed), but only when
the faces were presented briefly and masked such that
participants did not report seeing the faces. For faces
that could be clearly seen and thus consciously processed, decreased amygdala activation for Black relative
to White faces was accompanied by activation in areas
of the PFC and the anterior cingulate gyrus — areas associated with cognitive control.
Interestingly, it appears that mental activities that
counteract prejudiced thoughts may diminish control in other situations. According to Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, and Tice (1998), self-regulation is a
limited resource, and any act of control not only uses
up resources at the time of control, but also for some
time afterward while the system recuperates. Richeson
and Shelton (2003) found that after non-prejudiced
White participants interacted with a Black individual
— a task that may require cognitive control for participants who harbor prejudice but want to act or appear
egalitarian — they subsequently performed worse on
the Stroop task, a task that requires cognitive control
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for incompatible trials (e.g., reporting that the word
green is in a red print color). In a follow-up fMRI study,
Richeson and colleagues (2003) scanned White participants while they viewed Black and White faces. Afterward, participants performed the Stroop task. As in
Cunningham and colleagues (2004), greater activation
was observed in the right lateral PFC while participants
viewed Black compared with White faces. Furthermore, the degree of right PFC activity while viewing
Black faces during the fMRI task predicted subsequent
Stroop performance, with those with the most right
PFC activity during fMRI performing the worst on the
Stroop task. Presumably, the cognitive cost of control
was manifested in the subsequent cognitive task. This
pattern of findings provides support for the idea that
nonprejudiced participants attempt to regulate their
emotional responses to Black faces.
In light of these findings (and the work dis- cussed
earlier), the amygdala should not be considered a
source of prejudice, but as a component in a larger
framework of competing automatic and controlled processes which modulate the expression of prejudice. For
example, Phelps, Cannistraci, and Cunningham (2003)
reported on a patient who, despite bilateral amygdala
damage, still showed evidence of automatic race biases
on an indirect mea- sure of automatic associations, suggesting that automatic evaluative responses are possible
without an amygdala. This is consistent with the position that the amygdala is better characterized as a responsive component to motivationally relevant stimuli,
instead of strictly negative, fearful, or threatening stimuli (Canli et al., 2005; Cunningham et al., 2004, 2008;
Mather et al., 2004).
In the processing of social groups, and people or objects in general, other areas are associated with processing emotional intensity and valence, notably, the right
prefrontal and orbitofrontal cortex. While explicit acts
of hate and more overt forms of discrimination are
the most salient features of prejudice, they often overshadow a complementary form of prejudice in the form
of positive associations toward ingroup members. Indeed, the history of intergroup conflict provides strong
evidence that “ingroup love” is a more common root
of discrimination than “outgroup hate” (Brewer, 1999).
Moreover, in contexts where discrimination arises as a
result of differential evaluations of two groups, ingroup
bias can lead to the same patterns of discrimination as
outgroup derogation. Take, for example, racial discrimination in the context of a hiring decision: ingroup bias
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and outgroup derogation would both lead a White candidate to be hired over a Black candidate. Although
these decisions are the result of different affective processes, the result is identical — the candidates receive
unequal levels of treatment and discrimination ensues.
Recent research has begun to examine the neural processes involved in these ingroup and outgroup biases.
In one study, participants were randomly assigned to a
novel mixed-race team without a history of contact or
conflict with an outgroup team (Van Bavel, Packer, &
Cunningham, 2008). Following assignment, participants
spent three minutes memorizing the team membership of 24 faces, and these faces were presented during
fMRI scanning. Unlike previous research that has found
greater amygdala activation to Black than White faces,
this study found greater amygdala activation to team ingroup than outgroup faces, regardless of race. Although
this may seem counterintuitive if one takes the view
that the amygdala responds only (or primarily) to threatening stimuli, it is consistent with the view that amygdala activation reflects the processing of the affective nature of motivationally significant stimuli (Anderson &
Phelps, 2001; Cunningham et al., 2008). In many cases,
negative or threatening stimuli take this role; however,
in some situations positive stimuli can have greater motivational significance. The results from this study imply
that, in the absence of intergroup conflict and outgroup
derogation, the ingroup may be motivationally primary
(see also, Allport, 1954). This suggestion was bolstered
by finding additional activations in reward processing
regions, such as the striatum and orbitofrontal cortex,
that show greater activation to ingroup than outgroup
faces and that significantly correlated with self-reported
preferences for ingroup (vs. outgroup) members.
Political Attitudes
As social neuroscience investigations have begun to
inform our understanding of basic social psychological processes, researchers have started to apply these
findings to improve our understanding of political behavior. Although research in this area has typically focused on replicating previous evaluative effects in the
domain of political judgment (e.g., Kaplan, Freedman,
& Iacoboni, 2007), other research has taken into consideration that fact that the evaluation of political candidates differs from other evaluative categories in that people rarely have direct exposure to the candidate, and the
evaluation is often influenced by group membership and
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political ideology (Westen, Blagov, Harenski, Kilts, &
Hamann, 2006). Though undecided voters may be relatively more open to new information, once people have
made a decision about which political candidate to support in an election they have a tendency to minimize the
influence of any new information that may be inconsistent. For example, once one has decided to support candidate X, he or she may not want to learn about any inconsistencies in candidate X’s statements. On this view,
motivated reasoning helps to maintain attitudes in the
face of inconsistent information (e.g., Rahn, 1993), and
as such, the study of political attitudes may allow for a
better understanding of the motivational components of
attitude acquisition, expression, and change.
Although motivated reasoning often prevents attitude
change, there are situations in which attitudes about
political candidates may, and perhaps should, change.
Voters who are uncertain, have weak or ambivalent attitudes, or those who are low on identification with
a political party may be more likely to show attitude
change in response to new information about a political candidate (e.g., Lavine, 2001; Lodge & Taber, 2005;
McGraw, Hasecke, & Conger, 2003). Unlike attitude
change resulting from direct experience, attitude change
here likely involves the integration of new semantic information or inferred group membership to generate new attitudes. Thus, attitude change should be expected to require more prefrontal components that may
serve to shape attitude representations. Consistent with
this idea, when exposed to negative political advertising,
participants who showed greater activation in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex also showed greater negative
attitude change (Kato, et al., 2009). This pattern of results supports the hypothesis that, unlike reversal learning in simple conditioning, attitude change for more abstracted information like political attitudes may require
a reorganization of information mediated by the prefrontal cortex (O’Reilly, Noelle, Braver, & Cohen, 2002).
Political evaluation is often considered to be a deliberate act, where people weigh various options and develop
a coherent political ideology. Yet, political ideology can
also operate relatively automatically, coloring and shaping our perceptions of people and the information that
they present. For instance, while people with low political expertise may be more open to new information, people with high political expertise and identification are
more likely to interpret new information in terms of automatically accessible schemas. Knutson, Wood, Spampinato, and Grafman (2006) demonstrated that, in contrast
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to people who were less politically involved, highly politically identified participants had less lateral prefrontal cortex activity when responding to politically relevant
stimuli. These data suggest that highly identified people
engaged with particular information in a less deliberate
fashion. As such, political experts may be able to rely on
already established schemas to make quick evaluations,
which may allow them to automatically interpret and incorporate consistent information into existing schemas.
Political ideology can also function as a social identity and guide our perceptions of others. For example,
in one study participants were asked to think about the
opinions and preferences of a person who had a similar or dissimilar political affiliation (Mitchell, Macrae, &
Banaji, 2006). It was assumed that participants who more
strongly identified with a certain political party would
process a similar-minded person as an ingroup member,
and therefore activate brain areas that have been linked to
self-referential processing. For example, liberals were expected to be able to understand the mental states of another liberal more than a conservative, and the converse
was expected for conservatives. Considering the mental state of a similar other led to activity in ventral areas
of the medial prefrontal cortex (PFC), whereas considering the mental state of a dissimilar other led to activity in more dorsal areas of the medial PFC. Interestingly,
individuals who strongly self-categorized with a political
group, as measured by the IAT, had greater ventral medial PFC activity to politically similar others and less dorsal medial PFC activity to dissimilar others. Because regions of the medial PFC have previously been implicated
in building mental models of other minds and simulating the thoughts and feelings of other people (a process
called mentalizing; Mitchell, 2006), with more ventral areas being more involved in the processing of self-relevant
information (Kelley et al., 2002), the authors concluded
that although similar and dissimilar others both recruit
regions involved in understanding others, similar others
were more likely to be processed like the self.
Summary
Although understanding attitudes presents a considerable challenge for scientists, there is a rich history of
relevant theoretical ideas and findings from social and
cognitive psychology and intriguing new findings from
social cognitive neuroscience. Borrowing from the literatures on reinforcement learning and affective processing, we can appreciate the intricate neural systems that
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attitudes operate upon. Interestingly, many of the same
brain regions that are involved in expression, formation,
and change appear to be identical, suggesting a unified
set of dynamic processes that can give rise to multiple
attitudinal phenomena. As such, evaluation may reflect
the current processing of an integrated information processing system at any given time. The particular ways
in which information is constrained, weighed, and integrated as evaluations are constructed online from attitudes and the exact computations of the various brain
regions involved in these processes will require more indepth investigation.
More importantly, much of this research has examined relatively simple learning paradigms, or responses
to relatively simple attitude stimuli (i.e., an aversive task,
shock, or facial expression). Although attitudes can be
formed under several of these types of situations, we
have suggested that they are much more likely to be
formed by a complex interaction of social and contextual factors. Using neuroimaging techniques, we are
just beginning to uncover how different brain regions
contribute to the formation and change of attitudes,
and particularly how these can be applied to important social issues such as prejudice and political behavior. A more thorough investigation of the interplay between attitudes, the situation, and the mind is crucial for
a deeper understanding of attitudes, both whence they
came from and where they are going.
Note
1. Although the NAcc is correlated with buying behavior, it is unclear from these fMRI studies whether this is the result of the
motivational dopaminergic “wanting” or the more hedonic
opioid “liking” subdivisions of the NAcc (Berridge, Robinson,
& Aldridge, 2009).
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